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SYMPOSIUM ON RACIAL BIAS AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Introduction 
Hon. Steven C. González* 
At Seattle University School of Law’s Symposium on Racial Bias 
and the Criminal Justice System, students, faculty, judges, scholars, law-
yers, and community members gathered to address racial disparity in the 
criminal justice system and to explore ways to keep the promise of our 
democracy that we all are equal before the law. Race, ethnicity, skin col-
or, and national origin profoundly influence our legal structure and our 
liberty. The way that race influences perceptions and actions is critically 
important in the context of our criminal justice system—a system that 
changes lives, disrupts and protects communities, and represents a key 
part of our struggle for justice. 
Washington’s Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System 
(Task Force) came together to investigate disproportionalities in the 
criminal justice system and their possible causes, with the aim of making 
recommendations for changes to promote fairness and instill public con-
fidence.1 The symposium is part of the Task Force’s call to action, and 
the scholars who contributed articles to this issue of the Seattle Universi-
ty Law Review share a commitment to this effort. The articles form a val-
uable collection as they examine a wide range of actors in the criminal 
justice system: criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and law 
enforcement. The articles are diverse in subject and style, but read to-
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gether they highlight the key steps for moving toward our dream of com-
pletely eliminating racial bias in criminal, civil, juvenile, and family law 
matters. Those steps include (1) acknowledging that racial bias exists, (2) 
engaging in research and discussion regarding its causes and impact, and 
(3) collaborating in order to achieve solutions. 
I. ACKNOWLEDGE 
The Task Force began by acknowledging the indisputable fact that 
there is racial and ethnic disproportionality in Washington’s criminal 
justice system.2 Scholars in this issue similarly start with important 
acknowledgements about our social and legal landscape. 
In O.P.P.: How “Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May Improve 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence For All, Lenese C. Herbert acknowl-
edges that race is not biology but rather a social and legal construct 
around which structures have been built and identities formed.3 She de-
scribes race as a distorted prism through which we—even those of us 
who are the object of racial biases—think about the world and perceive 
our experiences.4 Viewing the world through the distorted prism of race 
has resulted in a collective unconsciousness about police violence toward 
blacks.5 Occupy protesters’ shock about police violence, despite the simi-
lar experiences of recent civil rights protestors, makes it apparent that 
expectations of privilege and power have developed along racial lines.6 
In positioning a historically immune group of people who are white as 
victims of police violence, Occupy reveals that “whiteness” is a social 
and legal construct—an ideological proposition about who has privilege, 
power, and property. The outcry over police violence, regardless of col-
or, positions us to acknowledge collectively what should have been 
acknowledged before—that race-based stratifications and differentiation 
are a result of political and social, not scientific or actual, constructs. 
Herbert’s work brings consciousness to the ways that discrimination and 
injustice are still undeniable social facts because race has been built into 
our social structures and self-identities in distorted ways. 
Mario L. Barnes, Robert S. Chang, Clayton Mosher, and J. Mitchell 
Pickerill acknowledge the racially disparate rates of citations and vehicle 
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searches in Washington State.7 Mosher and Pickerill broaden the tradi-
tional academic definition of racial profiling in a way that acknowledges 
the potential for bias to influence not only decisions to stop or appre-
hend, but also decisions about whom to cite and arrest, who to search, 
and against whom to use force.8 Barnes and Chang acknowledge that our 
antidiscrimination laws fall short and that “much discrimination occurs 
for which there is no legal remedy.”9 They advocate for an investigation 
of the ways that unconscious or implicit bias operate to produce disparate 
outcomes.10 
In The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecuto-
rial Discretion, Robert J. Smith and Justin D. Levinson acknowledge that 
“the power to be lenient is . . . the power to discriminate.”11 They exam-
ine how implicit bias affects decisions at key points of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Bias operates when prosecutors make charging decisions; it op-
erates when prosecutors make strategic pretrial decisions, such as wheth-
er to oppose bail, offer a plea bargain, or disclose potentially exculpatory 
evidence to the defense; and it operates in trial strategy when prosecutors 
decide to strike potential jurors.12 
Andrea D. Lyon acknowledges implicit bias on the other side of the 
adversarial system—a topic that has received less treatment in public 
discourse. In Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Crimi-
nal Defense Attorneys, Lyon shares that although she began working at 
the public defender’s office in Chicago with the expectation that she and 
her colleagues were “good” on race issues, she learned that “there is no 
person without prejudices.”13 Lyon specifically highlights how she has 
observed biases exhibited among defense attorneys when interacting with 
clients and when selecting a jury. By framing the discussion around her 
own experiences, she brings a uniquely personal tone to this collection of 
articles. Lyon posits that our most important focus should be to develop a 
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willingness to be introspective; it is by acknowledging bias, which is 
“not invisible or immutable,” that we overcome it.14 
When we acknowledge in an individual and collective way that race 
is a social construct, that we observe racially disparate outcomes in the 
criminal justice system, and that implicit bias affects decision-making 
processes, we provide a platform for engaging in research and discus-
sion. 
II. ENGAGE 
The work of a group of researchers studying perceptions of judicial 
bias in Israel gives us an opportunity to reflect on the tone with which we 
must engage in dialogue and debate: without calling each other names or 
making assumptions, with openness, and with an awareness of the sub-
jective status of our own views. In Actual Versus Perceived Performance 
of Judges by Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, and Issi Rosen-Zvi, re-
searchers explore the relation between perceptions of bias and the under-
lying reality of judicial behavior.15 They surveyed the Israeli legal com-
munity’s perceptions of Israel Supreme Court justices’ biases in criminal 
cases and compared the results with justices’ actual votes. Ultimately, the 
researchers conclude that justices’ actual voting patterns in mandatory-
jurisdiction criminal cases do not explain perceptions of the justices as 
being either pro-state or pro-defendant.16 Their research also revealed 
that media reports of justices correlate better with perceptions and that 
both prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to view justices as hostile to 
their clients’ positions.17 The article urges us to move from rhetoric and 
accusation to debate through empirical research and measurement.18 
In this symposium collection, two groups of researchers engage in 
debate about studies of bias in policing in Washington State.19 Research-
ers commissioned by the Washington State Patrol have been conducting 
research on racial profiling since 2001.20 Bivariate analyses of stops, ci-
tations, and searches have revealed racially disparate outcomes. Black, 
Native-American, Asian, and Hispanic drivers are more likely to be is-
sued citations than white drivers in between twenty-nine and forty of the 
forty autonomous patrol areas in the state.21 
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In Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Appli-
cations to the Washington State Patrol, Mosher and Pickerill discuss im-
portant methodological challenges for analyzing data related to stops, 
searches, and seizures. To address these methodological issues, Mosher 
and Pickerill undertake a more detailed multivariate analysis, trying to 
control for additional factors to see if racial disproportionalities can be 
accounted for by nonracial factors.22 Mosher and Pickerill posit that 
analysis of citations in the context of traffic stops needs to take into ac-
count the possibility that “some members of minority groups are less 
likely to comply with traffic laws, may be more likely to have a higher 
number of traffic violations, and may be more likely to be involved in 
more serious traffic offenses, such as driving while impaired.”23 These 
“nonracial” factors increase the probability of receiving a citation. 
Mosher and Pickerill find attenuated racial bias in the issuing of citations 
when the number and seriousness of violations across racial groups are 
controlled for.24 
In Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and Be-
yond, Barnes and Chang challenge the methodology of and conclusions 
drawn by Mosher and Pickerill.25 While Barnes and Chang agree that 
evidence does not support a finding of widespread intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of the Washington State Patrol, they argue that race 
remains a factor that heightens the probability of citation or search, even 
when age, seriousness of the violation, race of the officer, time of day, 
and location of the stop are controlled for.26 Barnes and Chang allege 
several methodological flaws in Mosher and Pickerill’s approach and 
conclude that their own data point toward the operation of implicit bias.27 
A group of Seattle University law students also engage in debate 
over the rules articulated in State v. Monday28 and the impact of implicit 
racial bias on prosecutorial conduct. In “If Justice Is Not Equal For All, 
It Is Not Justice”: Racial Bias, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Right 
to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, Michael Callahan argues in favor of 
the concurring opinion’s rule, which would not subscribe to the majori-
ty’s “illusory harmless error standard” and instead advocated reversal 
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any time racial bias is injected into a criminal trial.29 On the other hand, 
in “Like Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing”: Combating Racial Bias in Wash-
ington State’s Criminal Justice System, Krista L. Nelson and Jacob J. 
Stender argue that both the majority and concurring opinions in State v. 
Monday at least address the harm of subtle, unconscious racial bias, 
which is a step in the right direction.30 They argue that what remains 
open to debate is how to identify implicit racial bias and how to combat 
its use.31 
III. COLLABORATE 
We must continue to engage in discussion and explore competing 
ideas about approaches. Solutions are to be found in collaboration. 
Smith and Levinson call for collaboration among researchers and 
policymakers to tackle an implicit bias research agenda in The Impact of 
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion.32 They 
discuss the ways in which the “implicit bias revolution” creates opportu-
nities to empirically investigate how actors within the legal system can 
perpetuate discrimination in ways that have been—until now—almost 
impossible to detect.33 Offering that “the best science is collaborative, 
transparent and forward looking,” Smith and Levinson urge researchers 
to join them in building up a body of proof to support contentions that 
implicit racial bias affects the decisions of prosecutors.34 For example, 
they suggest that researchers can test whether participants subliminally 
primed with black and white faces make different decisions when decid-
ing how to charge suspects in borderline cases.35 
Herbert’s article about Occupy situates us at a pivotal “moment of 
clarity”36 and at a time in history when a current social movement pro-
vides a profound opportunity to collaborate across historic barriers. Her-
bert points to the potential for a paradigm-shift that would be founda-
tional for fostering collaboration and changing our legal framework.37 
Herbert’s article connects the past and present, highlighting the historical 
connection that has been overlooked between civil rights protestors and 
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Occupy protestors.38 As shared experience brings consciousness of im-
plicit bias and race as a social construct, we hope we can come together 
over common concern about police conduct, criminal prosecutions, crim-
inal defenses, and judicial determinations. Racial bias in the criminal 
justice system is not just a “people of color” problem; it is our problem 
as a society to address. We must collaborate to move beyond incoherent, 
socially constructed concepts of race. 
*** 
There are insufficient studies of implicit racial bias in the criminal 
justice system and an insufficient legal framework for addressing the bias 
that affects criminal justice outcomes. The articles in this collection and 
the dialogue at the symposium begin to fill in missing pieces. We have 
much to commend and much more that needs work. Progress happens at 
the level of events, not of words, and participating in this symposium is a 
valuable response to the Task Force Report’s call to action. The varied 
tone and style of the articles highlight how many areas there are for 
scholars and citizens of all backgrounds and disciplines to enter the dia-
logue. Diversity among the voices in the dialogue and in positions within 
the legal system is valuable for efforts to eliminate the operation of im-
plicit racial bias and improve the quality of decision-making. In address-
ing racial bias, we are tasked with hard work as a community and as in-
dividuals. With the kind of public discourse and introspection that this 
symposium and collection of scholarly work represents, we can 
acknowledge, engage, and collaborate to become more culturally compe-
tent individuals in a more just society. 
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